Relationscapes by Erin Manning – Dictionary of Terms


Below are a collection of terms I found most compelling during my read of Relationscapes by Erin Manning. I have included citations that seem most relevant to my possible studies. Hopefully this “dictionary” of sorts can serve as a reference guide to the contents of this great read.

Check out the following posts to see how I put some of Manning’s terms to use:

Manning, E. (2009). Relationscapes : movement, art, philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


  • “affect passes directly through the body, coupling with the nervous system, making the interval felt. This feeling is often experienced as a becoming-with. This becoming-with is transformative. It is a force out of which a micro perceptual body begins to emerge. This micro perceptual body is the body of relation. While affect can be separated from a body, it never takes hold on an individual body. Affect passes through, leaving intensive traces on a collective body-becoming. This body-becoming is not necessarily a human body. It is a conglomeration of forces that express a movement-iwth through which a relational individuation begins to make itself felt” (p. 95)


  • dynamic expressions of movement in its incipiency. They have not yet converged into final form. […] pure plastic rhythm.” Manning proposes that we “move toward a notion of a becoming-body that is sensing body in movement, a body that resists predefinition in terms of subjectivity or identity, a body that is invovled in a reciprocal reaching-toward that in-gathers the world even as it worlds. These bodies-in-the-making are propositions for thought in motion. Thought here is not strictly of the mind but of the body-becoming. Thought is never opposed to movement: thought moves a body” (p. 6)
    • for more discussion of “sensing body in movement” see Manning, 2007
  • working with the “fold” – “Bodies become many-timed, many-spaced” (p. 20)
  • “Bodies are never independent of the extensions of space and the matter of time: bodies are durational. The interval makes this duration manifest, virtually” (p. 25)
  • a body is always “more-than” just a body – this condition of “more than” is the very condition of the becoming-body (p. 64)
  • “A body perceives through difference. A change in environment provokes a sensory event. Whitehead suggest that perception is both sensuous (sensed) and non-sensuous (a direct perception of pastness in the present). To perceive is not simply to accumulate sense-data: it is to directly sense relation as the virtual activity inherent in the taking-form of objects and worlds. It is not that a ‘subject’ perceives a world but that the world is pulled into experience” (p. 66) s

causal efficacy:

  • causal efficacy = “what activates our capacity to world, “the stage of perception that refers to the immanent relationally of all experience” (p. 54)
  • “causal efficacy activates the how of experience. It is non-sensuous in that it builds on pastness: it is ‘heavy with the contact of the things gone by, which lay their grip on our immediate selves’ (Whitehead 1927, 44). This experience of pastness folds into relational presentness that gives experience the breadth that opens it to activation. Through casual efficacy, we immediately feel our connectedness to the world in its present appearance” (p. 54)
  • “Causal efficacy provides the datum for presentational immediacy, and presentational immediacy propels the immediate givenness of the causal event toward the complexity of lived experience. Without the two together, we cannot fully participate in experience. The world flattens when causal relationally falls out of it, becoming ‘stained glass windows.’ What is experienced is not a wording but an infinite refraction of colored glass. It’s like a sensory overload without anywhere to fold in, but infinitely” (p. 56)


  • “the plane of experience on which expressive finality has not yet taken hold. As thought shifts toward expression, it moves through concepts in prearticulation. How thought become concept is parallel to how duration become experiential space-time” (p. 6)
  • “a way of thinking space-time qualitatively without submitting it to a certain measuring out of space. Duration is the rendering of what Bergson calls intensive magnitudes: ‘Pure duraction might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number; it would be pure heterogeneity’ (2002, 61).” (p. 17)
  • “When duration makes itself felt, a hesitation occurs where y we perceive the fluid force of the world’s becoming. Whitehead calls this force of feeling presentational immediacy. This perceptual experience is a relational movement that worlds even as it culls from it swirling the qualities and effects of this dynamic process. Presentational immediacy is perceptually felt duration. What is felt is movement’s lingering, its hesitation. This is what we actively perceive in Marey’s smoke-filled images: the strange, ethereal passings-through, foggy expressions of movement’s potential to linger” (p. 111)

events/the event:

  • “taken form in the concreteness of time and space. This does not mean that time and space precede them […] events create time and space” (p. 7)
    • “Events do not perish into nothingness. Like memories, they can be reactivated. To reactivate an event is not to recreate the same movement again but to invent a new movement that calls forth a certain array of recognizable elastic points. This new movement will be virtually populated with the pastness that constitutes the experience of moving in that way” (p. 39)
  • “An event is always singular, completely absorbed by its particular iteration. Events are never relational in their actualization: they relate across the nexus of experience in their incipiency – their pastness – or in their perishing – their future-pastness” (p. 7)
    • in movement, displacement is not the event, “the event is the composition of space-time that qualitatively alters the topological dimensions of our sensing bodies in movement” (p. 18)
  • “Events are only events because they perish. It is their perishing that culminates their potential. The perishing is not the end: it propels the preacceleration of a new occasion of experience. Once the subjective form composes itself, the experience has been constituted, and the event is nearing its completion. It has done its work. The feel the elasticity is always to know we are on the edge. When the elastic contracts, we feel at once the perishing of the events and the propulsion of the next preacceleration. This is because the elastic force is as present in its stretching as in its contraction, always stimulating the intensive spiral of a new becoming-movement. Perished actual occasions populate the nexus out of which experience is made. There is no movement that is not nested within another movement with which it is in continuity. As events become and perish, they create openings for new events” (p. 39)
  • “The event created by relational movement is not only concerned with two dancers. An occasion of experience always carries the many in the one. The modes of functioning that makes the experience palpable jointly constitute its process of becoming” (p. 40)
  • “Every event is relational. Events create relation as much as relation creates events. We cannot know in advance what an event can do, any more than we can know what a body can do” (p. 41)
  • “I do not perceive an object per se, the objectless is pretended (drawn out from a pastness in a way that is qualitatively new) as an event that space-times me. Through the prehension, “I” am subjectified as an instance of that particular object-event. This object-event constructs me – individuates me – as much as it is individuated by me. Such an experience is actively creative: “I” must assist the perception, fill up its holes, give it form. This giving-form happens as “I” (as individuating event) fill in gaps of perception, giving the object a contour or a background (that “I” may not directly have perceived), situating it in a wordless that cannot be separated from it. As “I” do this, “I” am also individuating (moving beyond any kind of discrete “I-ness” or thanness) on a plane of becoming, that Whitehead calls an actual occasion. “I” am not detached from this process, and yet “I” am only composed by it to the extent that it will initiate re-composition. I is an event.” (p. 67)
  • “Objects emerge in relation as events of experience” (p. 67)
  • prehensions = “events of perception. They pull what become actual occasions from the extensive continuum of experience. The extensive continuum is made up of the undifferentiated folds of the universe. The outfolding through pretensions of the infolding of experience propels the taking-form of an event. With its unfolding into an event comes the expression of life in the making” (p. 77)
  • “Life is as complex as the actual events that compose it. These actual events are multiple, each of them composed of pretensions culled from the magnitude of pastness non-sensuously felt as the present passing. Non-sensuous perception is the activity of perceiving the tonality of pastness in the present. Non-sensuous perceptions shade the currency of futurity. Perception as the infolding of the potential for activation of the future-past is the relational nexus for life-in-the-making. Perception is not the taking-in of an object or a scene. IT is the folding-with that catches the event in the making” (p. 77)
  • “Each event is contemporarily independent from all other events even as it holds within itself – via its infinite foldings – the potential to create an associated milieu. This associated milieu does not change the actual form of the occasion, but it does alter its resonance. It foregrounds a quality that would otherwise be backgrounded” (p. 79)


  • “Ontologies must remain thresholds – from being to becoming, from force to form to force. Identities do take form, but these are always brief individuations. To still becoming into a lingering identity is to try and stop movement. What must be sought is neither a total becoming nor a fixed identity: the dynamic equilibrium between identity and individuation is metastable. This means that it converges on many planes at once, more stable on some, more active on others. To locate identity as the point of departure of a body is to deny the complexity of the concurrent planes of thought, expression, conceptualization, articulation” (p. 11)


  • “Intensity is of duration, not measure. Intensity has no extensive magnitude – it cannot be conceived as separate from pure experience. Positivism’s shortfall is its tendency to attempt tot capture intensity’s extension for a quantitative system of measure” (p. 96)
  • “Intensity is anathema to quantification. It concerns the elasticity of movement. Intensity in-gathers the imperceptible toward a movement-feeling. This movement-feeling is the experience of force taking form” (p. 96)
  • “Intensity cannot be measured because it cannot foresee how the future will inhabit it, what qualitative magnitudes will divert it, how elasticity will alter its process of taking form. Intensity is never the object of an experiment: it dwells in the milieu of its process. Grace emerges out of this milieu, not as marker of knowable future in the present, but as a calm carrier of future’s quasi chaos in the present-passing. Grace is the feeling of being in the eye of the storm, where calm reigns. Grace is out of measure and yet completely in sync with the future passing” (p. 97)
  • “Intensity can never be measured since to measure would immediately interrupt duration, transforming force into form. yet in the experience of the elasticity of the almost, the virtual resonance of intensity can be felt as movement moves through an actualizing form. While the intensity of passage is not present in the final concrescence of the form, it remains part of the feeling co-arising with the constitution of that particular form-taking” (p. 99-100)


  • “The interval belongs to a certain qualifying vocabulary such as that expressed through Whitehead’s ‘eternal objects.’ The interval is not a thing but a quality of light, speed, closeness, purpleness [..] The interval preexists all actual occasions, composing them but not perishing along with them (when they have become “satisfied”). While a prehension may create an actual occasion that in time will have served its purpose and disappear, the interval that incites the actual event to shape-shift will remain potentially active for the next preaccerleration. The interval is eternal. If we had to locate creativity, the interval could serve as its nexus” (p. 20)
  • “The interval cannot be shaped as such. It creates folding into which bodies capitulate, an opening into which we surge.” (p. 21)
  • “The interval is virtual, incorporeal. Yet it has substance: it is palpable. For Spinoza, substance is not prior to its attributes, nor does cause precede effects […] The interval never marks a passage: it creates the potential for a passage that will have come to be” (p. 24).
  • “Repetition is at the heart of the interval […] The interval provokes the movement but does not actually move” (p. 25)
  • can be thought of as the “plane of immanence” (p. 28)


  • Guattari – “the machinic expresses forces of creativity: ‘A machinic assemblage [is[ an assemblage of possible fields, of virtual as much as constituted elements, without any notion of generic or species’ relation’ (1995, 35). Machines demand life: they process always in the realm of the more-than, constantly recombining. Pure plastic rhythm is a machinic ways of redefining what a body is, and even more so, what a body can do” (p. 10).


  • “remembering a feeling involves activating relation by bringing into appearance a felines in the present passing. A memory is not an unfolding of the bottled past in the neutral present. Remembering is the activation of contrast that inflects the differential of experience unfolding such that the then is felt as an aspect of the nowness of experience. This is a relational event: it foregrounds the presentness through the past, emphasizing the quality of difference in their contrast. The events of the memory is how it takes form in the present, its hue activated through the contrast past-present, then-now” (p. 80)


  • “movement tells stories quite differently than does a more linear and stable historicization” (p. 8)
  • “To move is to engage the potential inherent in the preacceleration that embodies you. Preaccelerated because there can be no beginning or end to movement. Movement is one with the world, not body/world, but body-wording. We move not to populate space, not to extend it or to embody it, but to create it. Our preacceleration already colors space, vibrates it. Movement quantifies it, qualitatively. Space is duration with a difference” (p. 13)
  • relative movement vs. absolute movement:
  1. I enter a room and see that room as preexisting me. I walk across the room, drawing an imaginary line that cuts the space (relative movement)
    • we participate in a hylomorphic quandary where form preexists matter. The matter – my body – enters into the form – the room. Both body and room are pregiven in this instance. The room defines the limits of my body’s potential.
  2. My movement creates the space I will come to understand as “the room.” The room is defined as my body + the environment, where the environment is an atmospheric body. Without that particular moving body that particular environment does not exist. (absolute movement)
    • individuation occurs in intimate connection between the moving body and its atmospheric potential. The room becomes configuring as the body recomposes. There is no “body itself” here because the body is always more than “itself,” always reaching toward that which is not yet. The not-yet takes form through the intensities of preacceleration that compel recompositions at the level of both strata, the body and the room. What this means is that both body and space are experienced as alive with potential movement. The body-room series takes on an infinite variety of potential velocities. The body-room stratus is therefore neither object nor form, but infinite potential for recombination. When an event takes form with this malleable stratum, there is a configuration. Displacement is one such event. When a displacement actually occurs – a shift takes place that alters the coordinates of space-time, beginning the process anew, bringing new configurations to the machinic phylum body-room (p.15)
  • “When space-time is no longer entered but instead created, it becomes possible to think the body-world as that which is generated by the potential inherent in the preacceleration of movement. Movement takes time. But movement also makes time” (p. 17).
  • “Movement provokes duration even as duration provokes movement. Measurable quality is anathema to duration. The is why displacement itself – the movement from a to b – is not what is essential about movement. Movement is the qualitative multiplicity that folds, bends, extends the body-becoming toward a potential future that will always remain not-yet. This body-becoming (connecting, always) becomes-toward, always with. I move not you but the interval out of which our movement emerges. We move time relationally as we create space: we move space as we create time” (p. 17)
    • “The displacement is how the decision to move one way or another taken form. Movement is a process of individuation where matter and form remain in flux, virtually shape-shifting into malleable environments. These environments – alive in the interval – are always singular, but never one” (p. 18)
  • Forsythe: movement as “both extensive and intensive space.” (p. 18)
  • “Movement revels in the potential of the interval precisely because it contains the magic of forgetting that assures that every movement will begin anew, despite and because of the endless potential of its preaccelerated state. For preacceleration cannot be known as such. It is felt in its effects. It colors the way the movement becomes. But it can’t be repeated exactly the same way. Preacceleration is the expression of movement capacity for invention” (p. 18-19).
  • “Movement always begins with a certain degree of open improvisation mixed with a certain degree of habit. Every step we take when we walk is a replaying of a habit. This habit is a tendency to move to a certain rhythm, to take a certain size step, to bend at the hip or at the knee. These habits hold our walk to a practiced repetition: a choreography of sorts. Yet each of these habits take its shape from a preacceleration that proposed opening toward different shades of movement. These shades of movement are likely more visible in the walk of the dancer than in everyday movement, but even the everyday walk is an improvisation before it is a choreography” (p. 19)
  • “what takes form as we move is the actualization of virtual potential rich in each displacement. The eventness of movement is a virtually concretized differentiation of matter-form that creates a dynamics that is of the order of speed itself” (p. 19)
  • “To find movement is to work with preacceleration. This just-before is also a way to think duration rather than succumbing to linear time” (p. 20)
  • “To locate the many in the one and add one is to suggest that every movement is first and foremost collective: collective and singular. It is collective in the sense that it is relation, that is has a profound effect on the compoistion of its intensive extensions. These intensities become movements of thought, where thought is never distinct from the movement itself. Movements of thought are potential articulations of the political. Such articulations propose that we are never alone in the world: movements of thought are worldings that recombine the potential for collective thought” (p. 22)
  • displacement – “not as a movement through space but as a process of in-formation whereby space becomes what it is not-yet. Forming to deform the body composes to recompose” (p. 27)
  • “movement is incipient action: a dance of the not-yet” (p. 28)
  • “movement is not explained by sensation, but by the elasticity of sensation, its vis elastic.” (Deleuze – Logique de la sensation) – (p. 29)
  • “Walking ‘alone’ does not exist. Walking in/with the world: the only kind of walking” (p. 29)
  • process of movement: “Prearticulation fuels preacceleration, inciting a reaching-toward, not into a space predetermined, but toward a curving of space-time. Curving space-time moves the relation, activating a becoming-body. Movement’s intensive unfolding creates an embodiment of pure plastic rhythm. The fulfillment of the occasion is not the step but the recombination of forces out of which future movements will take form” (p. 37).
  • “To move is to create (with) sense” (p. 66)
  • “Movement produces rhythms as rhythms produce bodies” (p. 132)
  • “movement-with is affective: its tonality (its modalities, its resonances, its textures) alters both what a body can do and how the world can be experienced” (Whitehead 1933, 176) (p. 160)

incipient movement/incipiency:

  • “preaccelerates a body toward its becoming. The body becomes through forces of recombination that compose its potential directionalities” (p. 6)
  • “Incipiency opens up experience to the unknowable, follow through toward concrescence closes experience on itself. Of course, this closing-in is always a reopening toward the next incipient action” (p. 7)

movement of thought:

  • “Thought is never opposed to movement: thought moves a body” (p. 6)
  • thought “moves through the elasticity of the almost. The elastic point is the creativity of movement in the making. It is the ontogenic force through which becoming-form is felt. MOvement folds around this elastic point such that what is felt is not hte point per se but the elasticity of its becoming. This is a topological sensation – which is a paradox in itself: a topology of experience is a force-form before it is a feeling. Still, when we feel this sensation of ontogenetic force-taking-form, we do tend to smile, laugh, or at least feel surprised by the event as it expresses us” (p. 9)
  • Movements of thought are potential articulations of the political. Such articulations propose that we are never alone in the world: movements of thought are worldings that recombine the potential for collective thought” (p. 22)

relational movement:

  • in relational movement, “we will not always have the same contact, but contact will remain. This contact will be the impetus for creating movement. Remember: we also shape-shift at a distance” (p. 14)
  • “The most straightforward way to conceive relational movement is side by side, or face to face. Think walking with a lover, or dancing tango. Walking relationally means: when you walk into the hole, you walk-with. Walking-with is more than taking a step, it is creating movement” (p. 30)
  • “Relational movement means moving the relation. Moving the person will never result in grace. Intensity of movement can only b e felt when the in-between – the interval – created by the movement-with takes hold. THis interval is ephemeral, impossible to grasp as such, yet essential to the intensive passage from a step to a graceful movement” (p. 30)
  • relational movement is “always improvisational […] The essence of relational movement is the creation of a virtual node, an in-between that propels the dance, that in-forms the grace that is not strictly of the body but of the movement itself” (p. 31)
  • In relational movement, once I know that it is possible for my body to move a certain way, it is much more likely I will experiment with that way of moving.” (p. 39)
  • “Relational movement depends on a fluid assemblage that operates always in the between of constraint and improvisation. Each mode acts both as constraint and opening. ‘We do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor to the extent of our power,’ writes Spinoza. ‘How could we know this in advance?'” (p. 41)


  • “perception is enhanced by the quality of experience” (p. 69)
  • Perception is not the taking-in of an object or a scene. IT is the folding-with that catches the event in the making” (p. 77)
  • “‘Small perceptions are as much the passage from one perception to another as they are components of each perception’ (Deleuze 1993, 87). Small perceptions are […] imaging landing sites: they qualitatively site perception beyond the register of perceptual actuality. They are virtual recomposings of the force of perception. They feel the world wording, and they contribute to it, this contribution altering the dynamics at work in the relations they call forth. The regather perception recomposing the body its appetite for seeing-with.” (p. 80)
  • “Perception operates on the threshold of consciousness […] What we perceive is not the thing as such but its capacity for relation. Perceiving first and foremost the capacity for relation means that a stone is perceived, not as an object-as-such, but as the feeling of hardness in the hand. Perception is the feeling-with of an event forming” (p. 80)
  • “Perception is the force for the world’s infinite unfolding” (p. 81)
  • “To look at Marey’s photographs is to feel them. Feeling is an amodal experience that is a passing-between of sense-modes. Perception is constituted by feeling-tones. Perception lures feeling, coaslecing visual experience into a force of feeling. Affectively, feeling works on the body, bringing to the fore the experiential force of the quasi chase of the not-quite-seen” (p. 95)


  • referred to as “prearticulation” in some passages (mostly in reference to speech/speech-to-come)
  • “how movement can be felt before it actualizes […] the virtual force of movement’s taking form. It is the feeling of movement’s in-gathering, a welling that propels the directionality of how movement moves. In dance, this is felt as the virtual momentum of a movement’s taking form before we actually move. Important: the pulsion toward directionality activates the force of a movement in its incipiency. It does not necessarily foretell where a movement will go” (p. 6), see also: incipient movement
  • “In the preacceleration of a step, anything is possible. But as the step begins to actualize, there is no longer much potential for divergence; the foot will land where it lands.” (p. 7)
  • “a movement of the not-yet that composes the more-than-one that is my body. Call it incipient action” (p. 13)
  • “a way of thinking the incipiency of movement, the ways in which movement is always on the verge of expression. Bodies invent motion incessantly, creating habits to satisfy the carrying out of these inventions” (p. 14)
  • preacceleration: “we are going, always already.” (p. 14)
  • “In preacceleration, ther eis never simply one movement: different rhythms, different durations coexist” (p. 18)
  • “Movement revels in the potential of the interval precisely because it contains the magic of forgetting that assures that every movement will begin anew, despite and because of the endless potential of its preaccelerated state. For preacceleration cannot be known as such. It is felt in its effects. It colors the way the movement becomes. But it can’t be repeated exactly the same way. Preacceleration is the expression of movement capacity for invention” (p. 18-19).
  • “Preacceleration does not predict one displacement over another. It holds in abeyance openings, out of which shapes emerge, but control is not of the essence” (p. 19)
  • preacceleration is “like the breath that releases speech, the gathering-toward that leaps our bodies into a future unknowable. It goes something like this: preacceleration – relation – interval – intensification – actualization – extension – displacement – preacceleration” (p. 25)


  • prehensions = “events of perception. They pull what become actual occasions from the extensive continuum of experience. The extensive continuum is made up of the undifferentiated folds of the universe. The outfolding through pretensions of the infolding of experience propels the taking-form of an event. With its unfolding into an event comes the expression of life in the making” (p. 77)

radical empiricism:

  • spoken about in reference to Marey’s art and positivist experiments – which although trying to measure, create “speculative assemblages that induce complex sensations in the name of th apperception of perception. The irony: the degrees of precision he seeks in the production of quantifiable results contributes to the creation of event-based machines that provoke an active coupling of movement, bodies and milieu” (p. 99)
    • Marey’s experiments provoke the question: “Can there ever be ‘pure’ positivism, or is positivism always moved by the forces of intensive magnitude?” (p. 100)
  • in radical empiricism – “there is nothing prior to direct experience, and no way to work outside of experience’s incipient relationality. ‘For sure a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system’ (James 1912, 42). In Deleuzian terms, this means that what is foregrounded is not the object, the word, the concept but the assemblage through which ecologies of practice emerge” (p. 98)
    • radical empiricism – “experiments with assemblages such as the associated milieu, an environmental in-between that never preexists the force of its taking form. ‘This is assembling: being in the middle, on the line of encounter between an internal world and an external world’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 52)” (p. 98)


  • rhythm isn’t extra of external to experience – rhythm makes up events. It “gives affective tonality to experience, making experience this and not that. Rhythm techniques are not solely dedicated to sound: there is rhythm in inflection, in Kngwarreye’s brushstrokes, in William Forsythe’s movement improvisations, In Marey’s chronotographies. Rhythm comes to the fore through techniques for invention” (p. 9-10)
  • “Rhythm is experiential duration that dislodges any concept of universal time” (p. 23)
  • “Rhythm, the regenerative force of the associated milieu, is the transducer of sensation, the élan vital that provokes projections of sense into becoming-movement. Without rhythm, becoming-movement tends to divide and become diffuse.For relational movement, intensive rhythmic movement i key – diffusion guarantees confusion. This does not mean that we move to a rhythm. It means we move rhythm – that the very becoming of the movement is rhythmic. Rhythm takes two. Moving the relation is a rhythmic encounter with a shifting interval. Rhythm moves us before we know where we are going, even when we momentarily lose our connection. A typical situation: I change my mind suddenly and move not where the pulse of pre acceleration was moving the relation but where I suddenly decide I want to go. What happens: she hesitantly moves not into the space I physically open but into the opening I reaccelerated toward leading the direction I now expect her to follow. She moves where the movement was moving us – where I thought about going – rather than where I went …” (p. 35) – in reference to dancing without choreography with someone else
  • “Rhythms are never predictable” (p. 35)
  • Emile-Jacques Dalcroze, developer of “Eurythmics” – a taxonomy of rhythm – “rhythm is not solely of the ear. It is amodal, and even more than that, it is virtually physical. This discovery led him to question how rhythm was taught. Too often, he observed, rhythm is conceived as an external meter for an internal process. Yet rhythm, he writes, ‘call[s] for the muscular and nervous response of the whole organism'” (Dalcrose 1921, vi) (p. 131)
    • “rhythm is not cadence or measure. It is not external to experience. To extrapolate Dalcroze, this means that rhythm moves through elastic points on durational planes […] Rhythm can never be measured as such: it operates conjunctively. It is the and…and…and… of the rhizome that never finds a final territorialization. Rhythm provokes a milieu that is capable of accelerations and decelerations beyond the control of the apparatus that would seek to structure it […] rhythm becomes body […] ‘It is impossible to conceive a rhythm without thinking of a body in motion’ (Dalcroze 1921,82). Movement produces rhythms as rhythms produce bodies” (p. 132)


  • “Space … is not matter or extension but the schema of matter, that is, the representation of the limit where the movement of expansion (detente) would come to an end as the external evenlope of all possible extensions” (Deleuze, 1991, 87) (p. 25)


  • Guattari – process of subjectivization = “parallel to worlding, continuously reactualized through events of the present passing. This production consciousness depends on machines of combination such as the series individual-group-machine-world. this series is always already collective in the sense of its operating at vectors of relation and exchange. Subjectivity as Guattari proposes is a kind of heteropoiesis, a self-production in which the myriad components (prosthetic-organic) participate in the production and transformation of one another. Subjectivity ‘makes itself collective’ (Guattari 1995, 22). This does not mean that subjectivity as inherently collective is already political or social, but that the collectivity that is an emergent sensing body in movement is inariable an emergent articulation of the political” (p. 22-23)


  • Gilbert Simon (1995) defines them as “modalities for the creation of machinic resonances that defy a machine’s strict organization.” He suggests that a technical system is one where the whole cannot be subsumed to its parts, where what converges is more than the sum of its coordinates. Techniques are imbued with rhythm, they move-with the machine’s own forces of recombination” (p. 10)
  • “Techniques for invention cannot be captured. When they are, they become redundant: you cannot recompose with something that has already been spoken for. Techniques for invention must remain on the plane of composition” (p. 10)

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s